I haven't read the Minnesota bill, but certainly his comments are generally relevant to our conversation here in Massachusetts. Although I am in support of the proposed shared custody presumption here in Massachusetts, I do acknowledge, and even agree with, many of the points often raised against such presumptions. Many of the best arguments against such presumptions are contained in Gerald William's post. It would be good to read it if you are interested in this.
Specifically, Williams explains why the proposed shared custody presumption in Minnesota might very well increase the likelihood of conflict, both in and out of court (many proponents of such a presumption often argue that such a presumption would decrease conflict). I think this is a very important point. I have never joined with other supporters of the shared custody presumption in believing that conflict would magically disappear once we have such a presumption in place. I'm not at all sure whether there would be more or less conflict as a result and no one knows for sure.
Perhaps even more troubling, he further points out that the Minnesota proposal, by including the obvious exception to the presumption in cases of domestic abuse (there is also this in the Massachusetts proposal) would actually be likely to lead to an increase in the use of false allegations in domestic abuse proceedings, as more litigants would have an incentive to make such claims to escape the joint custody presumption:
One other concern is the domestic abuse exception that is written into the bill. The domestic abuse laws of Minnesota are good laws, with a very bad downside: false accusations. Domestic abuse proceedings are the classic, quintessential "he said, she said", and many litigants use the laws, in bad faith, as a tactic for undue advantage. This unfortunate practice would become only more common in the instance of a joint physical custody presumption with a domestic abuse exception.Of course, one obvious answer to that is that we also need reforms to reduce the incidence of such false allegations and fraudulent restraining orders, and fathers' groups, including Fathers and Families here in Massachusetts, have long called for such reforms as well. But still, we have to consider the very real possibility that mudslinging and false allegations would increase under a shared custody presumption, as we decide both whether we want to adopt such a presumption, and if so, how exactly we want to craft such a new law.
I certainly believe neither the current unstated presumptions or assumptions, nor a new, formal presumption in favor of joint custody can lead to a perfect system that will equally suit every type of family conflict. We have to make a choice, and the choice we make will likely cause more conflict in some instances and less conflict in others. But we can really only speculate as to how much more, or less, conflict we would face if such a presumption were adopted.
Of course, there are other concerns and interests, besides the degree of conflict in and out of court, which should guide us, and chief among them, I believe, is the interest in truth. The better, fairer, and more efficient are the mechanisms for getting to the truth in court, the more likely we will be to effect the best interests of children. That is so because, even though judges are quite fallible, they do generally desire to achieve what they believe is the right result. I believe most, if not all, of the apparent bias of judges would disappear once specific facts appeared to rescue them from their hunches and prejudices. The easier it is to get to the truth, the more often the right result will follow, whether the judge decides the case or not. And that is so because litigants - once they believe the truth would be likely to come out in court before either parent could gain an irreversible, unfair custody advantage - would be more likely to settle on that right result, whatever it is, rather than go to battle in court.
The bulk of cases will still be resolved by agreement, and mostly sooner rather than later, no matter whether we keep the current system or move to a formal presumption, and whether we have slightly more or less conflict in those toughest cases. The most important question for me, then, is what kind of system will lead to the fairest, best result for the most children. On balance, and speaking only for Massachusetts, based on my experience here, I think the shared custody presumption proposed here in Massachusetts, unless we can get the better reforms I proposed (see links to my posts below), would be a good move for us. However, there are certainly valid concerns on the other side, many of which you can find in the Minnesota blog.
For information about Massachusetts divorce and family law, see the divorce and family law page of my law firm website.
Frank Pasquale's suggestions drive at the core of what it means to evaluate rookie talent in legal academia. We need people who can organize classes for the benefit of students, identify and perhaps even challenge conventional wisdom, and communicate in a variety of contexts. I confess, though, that my immediate reaction to Mike's original post contemplated an altogether different format for legal academia's rookie combine. I contemplated tests of pure, raw intelligence.
At one level, Frank Pasquale's more logical interpretation of legal academia's rookie combine makes more sense. Identify the complex tasks we need to perform — akin, perhaps, to cut-blocking, bull-rushing, or route-running — and design tests that tests the full complex of skills. But Jeff Harrison has lamented, in ways I appreciate, that the usual tests of aptitude seem to yield a large number of legal academics who are neither intellectually interesting (as a static matter) nor intellectually curious enough (as a dynamic matter) to make better teachers and smarter colleagues of themselves.
Does the word equalizer (semi)automatically conjure images of the 
The University of Colorado has named Bruce Benson as its president, and 
By the same token, "those who dismiss the importance of academic skills" mistakenly assume that managerial acumen is freely transferable from business to academia, that "[s]omeone who can manage an oil company will be able to manage the enterprise of a university." As Fish observes, "in the academy there is no product except knowledge," and concepts such as market share, efficiency, and inventory yield in favor of "endless deliberations, explorations that may go nowhere, problems that only five people in the world even understand, lifetime employment that is not taken away even when nothing is achieved, expensively labor-intensive practices and no bottom line."
It's not that I disagree with much of what MoneyLawyer suggests. Good legal writing is good legal writing, and persuasive is persuasive. But where I live, the idea that judges are above mere mortals is sheer fantasy. It's not that there aren't smart judges (there are) or fair judges (there are) or judges who wear 
For law faculties that seek, above all else, to protect the sanctity of the rules and norms by which their current members secured admission, so long ago, to the sacred and secret brotherhood, The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent has an important corollary: The Rule Against Hiring. This rule has two variations, both of which lead to the same conclusion — Hire No One:
The world is filled with lock-ins of this sort. It isn't just technology. China clings to the horrifically misnamed Simplified Chinese writing system, and Japanese orthography still relies predominantly on kanji, even though both languages have homegrown phonetic writing systems. Some variant of the bopomofo phonetic alphabet can handle just about every Sino-Tibetan language; Hmong and Vietnamese got a little help from religiously inclined outsiders who adapted the Roman alphabet. Japanese has not one but two complete syllabaries: hiragana and katakana. At some point the Koreans overthrew the tyranny of Chinese-influenced ideograms once and for all, and as a result, to see a Korean word is to know instantly how to pronounce it.